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Abstract
We investigated whether income gaps in voting turnout vary with country-level 
economic inequality, and whether this pattern differs between wealthier and less-
wealthy countries. Moreover, we investigated whether the prevalence of clientelism 
was the underlying mechanism that accounts for the presumed negative interaction 
between relative income and economic inequality at lower levels of national wealth 
per capita. The harmonised PolPart dataset, combining cross-national surveys from 
66 countries and 292 country-years, including 510,184 individuals, was analysed 
using multilevel logistic regression models. We found that the positive effect of rel-
ative income on voting was weaker at higher levels of economic inequality, inde-
pendent of the level of national wealth. Although clientelism partially explains why 
economic inequality reduces the income gap in voter turnout, it does not do so in 
the way we expected. It seems to decrease turnout of higher income groups, rather 
than increase turnout of lower income groups. Importantly, that economic inequal-
ity reduces the income gap in voter turnout does not imply that economic inequality 
is positive for democratic representation, since economic inequality was found to 
depress the likelihood of voting for all income groups.
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It has been well established in the literature that “people with less vote less” 
(Laurison 2016, p. 684). Many studies, conducted in Western democracies, 
showed that the less income an individual has, the less likely he or she is to vote 
and participate in other forms of politics (e.g. Brady et al. 1995; Solt 2008, 2010, 
2015; Jensen and Jespersen 2017; Armingeon and Schädel 2015; Hakhverdian 
et  al. 2012; Smets and Van Ham 2013; Geys 2006). The existing research also 
revealed that the income gap in political participation differs between countries. 
To what extent people with different levels of income turn in ballots in a certain 
country depends on political and socio-economic conditions, economic inequal-
ity being among the most important ones (Solt 2008, 2010; Scervini and Segatti 
2012; Jaime-Castillo 2009; Matsubayashi and Sakaiya 2018). However, the find-
ings in the literature on how economic inequality at the country level affects the 
income gap in voting turnout are conflicting.
Three recent studies on the topic, that were based on a broad sample of coun-
tries, indicated that the income gap in voting is smaller in more economically 
unequal countries (Amat and Beramendi 2016; Jensen and Jespersen 2017; Mat-
subayashi and Sakaiya 2018). In those unequal countries, lower-income citizens 
seem to be at least as likely to vote as people from higher-income groups. This 
might be explained by the way how economic inequality influences mobilisa-
tion strategies of political parties (Amat and Beramendi 2016; Matsubayashi and 
Sakaiya 2018). Economic inequality provides an incentive for political parties to 
employ clientelistic mobilisation strategies. Such strategies mobilize especially 
the lower-income groups to vote, which decreases the income gap in voting.
On the contrary, studies that explicitly focused on advanced, relatively wealthy, 
democracies indicated that the income gap in voting turnout is larger in more eco-
nomically unequal countries (Gallego 2015; Solt 2008, 2010). The most promi-
nent explanation for this finding is the relative power theory, which assumes that 
more political power is in the hands of the higher income groups when economic 
inequality is higher. This leads people of lower income groups to perceive the 
political system as incapable to defend their interest, and therefore they abandon 
their engagement in politics.
When comparing the contrasting results of these studies, it seems like the asso-
ciation between economic and political inequality, and the underlying explanatory 
mechanisms, cannot be generalized across the world. It seems to differ between 
studies that only include advanced European democracies that are relatively 
wealthy, and studies that also include less-wealthy countries from other parts of 
the world. Even within Europe, the association between economic inequality and 
the income gap in voting does seem to depend on national wealth (Jensen and 
Jespersen 2017).
We aim to bring together previous studies on economic inequality and the 
income gap in voting by formulating separate hypotheses for wealthy and less-
wealthy countries. Based on the relative power theory (Solt 2008), we expect a 
positive association between economic inequality and the income gap in voting in 
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relatively wealthy countries. Based on recent studies that included a wider sample 
of countries (Amat and Beramendi 2016; Matsubayashi and Sakaiya 2018), we 
expect a negative association between economic inequality and the income gap in 
voting in less-wealthy countries. Moreover, we investigate whether the prevalence 
of clientelism is the underlying mechanism that accounts for the presumed nega-
tive interaction between relative income and economic inequality at lower levels 
of national wealth per capita.
We used the Harmonised PolPart1 dataset, which combines harmonised survey-
data from European Social Survey (ESS), Americas Barometer from Latin Ameri-
can Public Opinion Project (LAPOP), Asian barometer (ASIAN), World Values 
Study (WVS) and International Social Survey Programme (ISSP).2 Our final sam-
ple of analysis consists of 66 countries and 292 country-years, including 510,184 
individuals. We included a significant number of countries from different continents 
and thus exceed the most elaborate sample used in previous studies that explicitly 
tested the relationship between income inequality and voting [i.e. Matsubayashi and 
Sakaiya (2018): sample of 49 countries and 145 country-years].
Theory
Relative Income and Voting
We start at the individual level, with the relationship between an individual’s rela-
tive income and voting. In line with previous literature, we focus on an individual’s 
relative rather than absolute income. Relative income indicates an individual’s eco-
nomic position, relative to other individuals in his or her country. As Solt (2008) 
argued, an individual’s inclination to vote does not only depend on how much 
money he or she has, but also on how much money everyone else has.
From the resource mobilisation perspective (see Brady et al. 1995) it is argued 
that people need certain resources, like time, money and civic skills to be able to 
participate in politics. Income can also be regarded as an incentive for political par-
ticipation (Beramendi and Anderson 2008), indirectly related to voting through atti-
tudes towards politics. Among the most powerful explanations for why richer people 
are more likely to vote is that people with higher income are more interested in poli-
tics, because of what they can gain or lose by (not) having their representatives in 
political institutions (Gilens 2005). In other words, voting can be efficiently used by 
the rich for power-orientated (instrumental) reasons. Moreover, financial well-being 
has been shown to be positively related to levels of political trust (Schäfer 2013; 
Catterberg and Moreno 2006; Van der Meer and Dekker 2011), and political trust in 
1 This study was conducted within the PolPart project funded by ERC Grant No. 339829. The full title 
of the project reads ‘How citizens try to influence politics and why? International comparisons of move-
ment and party politics’. Principal Investigator is Prof. Dr. Bert Klandermans.
2 Unfortunately, we could not include data from the African Barometer in our analyses, since no compa-
rable measure of (relative) income is available from this survey.
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turn boosts the likelihood of voting because it implies positive expectations towards 
political institutions (Grönlund and Setälä 2007; Hooghe and Marien 2013). To 
sum up the theoretical arguments, it is well established in the literature that higher 
income citizens are more likely to vote compared to lower income citizens.
Relative Income, Economic Inequality and Voting
Comparative research in relatively advanced and wealthy democracies has indicated 
that the effect of relative income on voting is even stronger when the level of eco-
nomic inequality is higher (Gallego 2015; Scervini and Segatti 2012; Solt 2008, 
2010; Schäfer and Schwander 2019; but see also Filetti and Janmaat 2018). From the 
relative power theory (see Solt 2008, 2010) it is assumed that more political power 
is in the hand of the higher income groups when economic inequality is higher. 
This relatively large advantage allows wealthier citizens to dictate which issues will 
structure the political debate, and which ones will not be open for deliberation. The 
higher the economic inequality, the more the political debate will be determined by 
higher income individuals’ demands. From this perspective, it is thus assumed that 
economic inequality implies a concentration of not only money but also power and 
influence in the hands of higher income groups (Gallego 2015). This might explain, 
according to Solt (2008), why poorer citizens in unequal countries feel even less 
efficacious and more deprived from the political processes than the poor in less une-
qual countries. Therefore low income groups are less likely to vote when economic 
inequality is higher compared to when inequality is lower. Higher income groups 
are also assumed to be less likely to vote at higher levels of inequality, since the 
need to defend their interests from the demands of the lower income groups declines 
when these issues are not salient in the public debate, and when the turnout among 
the lower income groups is lower. However, according to relative power theory, the 
higher income groups are still motivated to participate in politics to some extent 
due to their conflicts with each other. In sum, the relative power theory predicts that 
economic inequality depresses the likelihood to vote for all income groups, but this 
effect is assumed to be stronger for the lower income groups (Solt 2008).
When especially the lower income groups vote less in more unequal countries, 
the income gap in voting is larger in these countries, and the effect of income on vot-
ing thus is stronger. The above-mentioned studies focused specifically on advanced 
democracies that are relatively wealthy and thus left the association between eco-
nomic inequality and voting turnout in less developed countries unexplored. Solt 
(2008) explicitly left the less developed economies from his study, because he 
assumed that lower-income citizens in those countries are likely to trade their politi-
cal support for particularistic benefits.
Indeed, more recent findings from studies that included wealthy as well as less-
wealthy countries in their sample show a pattern that contrasts relative power theo-
ry’s expectations. In a broad sample of countries from various continents, two recent 
studies concluded that higher levels of economic inequality seem to increase vot-
ing turnout of especially the lower income groups, resulting in smaller income gaps 
in voting in countries with high levels of inequality (Amat and Beramendi 2016; 
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Matsubayashi and Sakaiya 2018). To explain the association between economic ine-
quality and the income gap in voting, Amat and Beramendi (2016) elaborated on 
the role of clientelism as a mobilisation strategy of political parties. When following 
a clientelistic strategy, parties or politicians provide goods and services targeted to 
individual or small groups of voters, in exchange for the latter to reciprocate their 
vote. This exchange may have a short-term character, for example when promising 
consumables, benefits or marketable goods, but it may also be built around a longer-
term relationship, for example when promising access to services or employment 
over an extended period of time (Kitschelt and Kselman 2013). According to Amat 
and Beramendi (2016), a clientelistic strategy mobilizes the lower income groups, 
because lower income citizens are more responsive to direct benefits or bribes com-
pared to higher income citizens. Following Matsubayashi and Sakaiya’s (2018) 
argument about vote-buying, the likelihood to vote for higher income groups might 
be negatively affected by clientelistic mobilisation strategies. Since they are not the 
target of vote-buying, they might perceive political parties that employ clientelistic 
strategies as corrupt and unfair, which might negatively affect their sense of efficacy 
and their likelihood to vote (Matsubayashi and Sakaiya 2018).
Comparing the results between the various studies, and the proposed underlying 
mechanisms, leads us to argue that different mechanisms are at play in wealthy and 
less-wealthy countries. The association between economic inequality and the income 
gap in voting thus may depend on levels of national wealth. To test this explicitly, 
Jensen and Jespersen (2017) analysed data from the European Social Survey and 
included not only the rich European countries, but also less-wealthy Eastern European 
countries. They found that in general the positive effect of relative income on voting is 
weaker when economic inequality is higher, but additionally they found that this pat-
tern differs between the wealthier and less-wealthy countries in Europe. In the wealthy 
countries, the effect of income on voting turnout was stronger when economic inequal-
ity was higher, whereas the effect of income was weaker when economic inequality 
was higher in less-wealthy countries. We aim to test whether this pattern can be gener-
alized to a broader sample of countries, including wealthy and less-wealthy countries 
from several continents. Therefore we hypothesize that the relationship between eco-
nomic inequality and the income gap depends on national wealth in the following way:
H1 The effect of relative income on voting is stronger when economic inequality is 
higher, in relatively wealthy countries.
H2 The effect of relative income on voting is weaker when economic inequality is 
higher, in less-wealthy countries.
Next, we focus on the role of clientelism in explaining the different patterns in 
wealthy and less-wealthy countries. Amat and Beramendi (2016) propose the condi-
tions under which the political elites choose clientelism as a mobilisation strategy. As 
a first condition, the bureaucratic capacity of the state should be relatively low. In this 
case political elites have the capacity to hide part of their income from taxes, so that it 
is easier to use it for clientelistic purposes. Second, the share of low income citizens 
 Political Behavior
1 3
should be large, making clientelism an attractive strategy for political elites because low 
income citizens are assumed to be most responsive to this strategy. Third, the income of 
this group should be low, making the poor extra responsive to bribes or other forms of 
clientelism. Since national wealth and bureaucratic capacity are very strongly correlated 
(Kasara and Suryanarayan 2015), we assume that politicians are more likely to choose 
clientelistic mobilisation strategies when the average wealth in their country is low. 
Since levels of clientelism are presumably much higher in the less-wealthy countries, 
we argue that clientelism explains the predicted negative effect of economic inequality 
on the income gap in voting in these countries (see H2). To test this, we hypothesize:
H3 The negative interaction between relative income and economic inequality 
in the less-wealthy countries can be explained by the interaction between relative 
income and clientelism.
In the wealthier countries levels of clientelism are presumably lower and there-
fore we expect that clientelism will not cancel out the mechanism proposed in the 
relative power theory: that with higher economic inequality the lower income groups 
have less political trust and interest and are therefore less likely to vote.
Data
To test our hypotheses we used data from the harmonised PolPart dataset3 which 
combines existing survey data on political participation form different cross-
national surveys into a single dataset. For the analysis, we used data from multi-
ple waves of ESS,4 LAPOP,5 ASIAN,6 WVS7 and ISSP.8 Compared to the sample 
of countries used in previous studies, we especially added non-western countries. 
These data were collected between 2001 and 2016. A list of all included countries 
3 Instructions and codes for reconstructing this dataset, and for replicating our analyses, can be found via 
the Open Science Framework page: https ://osf.io/gztky /.
4 Source: European Social Survey Cumulative File, ESS 1–7 (2016). Data file edition 1.0. NSD—Nor-
wegian Centre for Research Data, Norway—Data Archive and distributor of ESS data for ESS ERIC.
 ESS Round 8: European Social Survey (2018): ESS-8 2016 Documentation Report. Edition 2.1. Ber-
gen, European Social Survey Data Archive, NSD—Norwegian Centre for Research Data for ESS ERIC.
5 Source: The AmericasBarometer by the Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP), www.
Lapop Surve ys.org.
6 Source: Asian Barometer. (2018). Asian Barometer Survey Data Release: 2001–2003, 2005–2008, 
2010–2012, 2014–2016. https ://www.asian barom eter.org.
7 Source: Inglehart, R., C. Haerpfer, A. Moreno, C. Welzel, K. Kizilova, J. Diez-Medrano, M. Lagos, P. 
Norris, E. Ponarin & B. Puranen et al. (eds.). 2014. World Values Survey: Round Five—Country-Pooled 
Datafile. Version: www.world value ssurv ey.org/WVSDo cumen tatio nWV5.jsp. Madrid: JD Systems Insti-
tute.
8 Source: ISSP Research Group (2012): International Social Survey Programme 2004: Citizen-
ship I. (ISSP 2004). GESIS Data Archive, Cologne. ZA3950 Data file Version 1.3.0, https ://doi.
org/10.4232/1.11372 .
 ISSP Research Group (2016): International Social Survey Programme: Citizenship II – ISSP 2014. 
GESIS Data Archive, Cologne. ZA6670 Data file Version 2.0.0. https ://doi.org/10.4232/1.12590 .
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and corresponding survey waves in our sample of analysis is available in the sup-
plementary materials. The individual-level data in the harmonised PolPart dataset 
were enriched with contextual data on economic inequality and clientelism at the 
country level, corresponding to the year in which the specific survey wave was 
performed. After listwise deletion, and after dropping five countries that score 
lower than 4 on the Freedom House Polity scale to minimize the risk of including 
countries where elections are very unfree, our final sample of analysis consists of 
66 countries and 292 country-year combinations, and a total number of 510,184 
respondents. Due to the large number of respondents from a large number of 
countries, representing six continents, the dataset allows us to study the income 
gap in voting at a wide range of levels of economic inequality, national wealth 
and clientelism.
Measurement
All individual-level variables that were used in the analyses were harmonised before 
they were included in the PolPart dataset. See Table 1 for the descriptive statistics of 
all variables. See Online Appendix 2 for a detailed description of the harmonisation 
procedure for each variable.
Dependent Variables
Voting In all surveys that were included in the harmonised PolPart dataset, respond-
ents were asked whether they had voted in the last (national, parliamentary or 
Table 1  Descriptive statistics 
for all variables in our sample 
of analysis
Mean SD Min Max
Individual level (N = 510,184)
Voting 0.76 0 1
Relative income 2.71 1.37 1 5
Education 2.94 1.37 1 5
Age 45.95 17.56 15 110
Female 0.52 0 1
Country-year level (N = 292)
Gini coefficient 0.35 0.08 0.23 0.53
GDP per capita 26.47 15.04 1.17 74.78
Clientelism 0.25 0.23 0.02 0.89
Compulsory voting 0.29 0 1
Majoritarian electoral system 0.10 0 1
Proportional electoral system 0.68 0 1
Mixed electoral system 0.22 0 1
 Political Behavior
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presidential) election. In the harmonisation procedure all respondents’ answers were 
recoded into two categories: yes (1) and no (0).
Independent Variables
Relative Income Household income was measured differently across surveys. Some 
surveys measured relative income, operationalised with income deciles (ESS after 
2006) or quintiles (ASIAN, ISSP). The original deciles or quintiles from these sur-
veys are based on the actual income distribution in the countries. Other surveys 
(LAPOP, WVS, ESS before 2006) measured income in a number of income catego-
ries, not based on the actual income distribution in the country. Therefore we based 
the income quintiles for each country-year in these surveys on the distribution of 
income in the corresponding sample. We recoded the income variables from all sur-
veys into income quintiles, indicating in which of the twenty-percent income groups 
the respondent’s income falls in the corresponding country: lowest income quintile 
(1), second (2), third (3), fourth (4), and highest income quintile (5). For a detailed 
explanation of how the income variable was harmonised across surveys, see Online 
Appendix 2.
To be sure that differences in the effect of relative income on voting are not caused 
by differences in measurement across surveys, we did some additional analyses (see 
Online Appendix 3). We took advantage of the fact that 21 countries are included in 
the ISSP in the same year that they were also included in one of the other surveys 
(ESS, LAPOP and ASIAN). We estimated the effect of relative income on voting for 
each country-year that is included in the ISSP survey and simultaneously in either 
ESS, LAPOP or ASIAN. Similarly, we found 18 countries that are both included 
in the ISSP 2004 and/or the WVS 5, and also included in either the ESS, LAPOP 
or ASIAN. The coefficient plots in Online Appendix 3 show the effects of relative 
income for each country-year for the surveys in which this country-year is included. 
In general, the effect of income is similar when compared between surveys within 
country-years. There are only a few country-years in which we found the effect to 
be substantially differ between surveys. Altogether, based on these additional analy-
ses we are confident that the differences in the effects of income on voting between 
country-years are not caused by differences in the operationalization of income.
Education We include individuals’ education in our analyses, as it is considered one 
of the most important resources for political participation (Dalton 2004). Respond-
ents were asked about the highest level of education they accomplished in all surveys. 
The number of answer categories varied between the surveys. The education vari-
ables were harmonised into a 5-category variable with categories: No education or 
only primary education (1); Some or lower secondary education (2); Completed or 
higher secondary education (3); Some (non-university) tertiary education (4); and 
University (5).
Female To control for a respondent’s gender we included a dummy variable that 
indicates whether a respondent is female (1) or male (0).
1 3
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Age To control for a respondent’s age we included a continuous variable that meas-
ures the absolute age of a respondent in years. We also created a quadratic term and 
included this in our models to account for possible non-linear effects of age.
Economic Inequality To measure economic inequality at the contextual level we 
used the Standardized World Income Inequality Database (SWIID). This dataset was 
constructed based on data from many national and international data sources. The 
SWIID uses a missing data multiple imputation algorithm to standardize the obser-
vations that were collected from the various source datasets in order maximize the 
comparability of Gini coefficients for the broadest possible sample of countries and 
years (Solt 2016). This means that all Gini coefficients are estimated 100 times for 
each observation (i.e. each country-year combination) in the SWIID dataset to cap-
ture the uncertainty in the estimates. We computed the Gini coefficient by taking the 
mean of the 100 estimates for each observation. We used the Gini index of net income 
inequality, which measures the distribution of household income after government 
taxes and transfers. A score of 0 indicates that each household receives an equal share 
of the income in the country, and 1 indicates that all income is received by a single 
household. For easier interpretation of interaction effects, we centred this computed 
Gini coefficient around the mean at the country-year level in the sample of analysis.
Wealth Data about the countries’ GDP per capita were retrieved from the Penn 
World Table (PWT) dataset (see Feenstra et al. 2015). For easier interpretation of 
interaction effects, we centred this variable around the mean at the country-year level 
in the sample of analysis.
Clientelism To measure the level of clientelism at the contextual level, we used the 
clientelism index from the Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) dataset9 (Sigman and 
Lindberg 2017). It measures to what extent politics is based on clientelistic relation-
ships. The index is formed by combining three components. The first component is 
vote-buying, measuring the extent to which vote buying was common during the most 
recent national election in the country. The second component is the extent to which 
social expenditures in the national budget are particularistic (i.e. narrowly targeted 
on a specific corporation, sector, social group, region, party, or set of constituents) as 
opposed to public good expenditures. The third component is party linkages, which 
refers to what sort of goods political parties offer in exchange for political support 
(clientelistic vs. programmatic). A high score on this clientelism index reflects that 
politics is to a large extent based on clientelistic relationships. For easier interpreta-
9 Coppedge, Michael, John Gerring, Carl Henrik Knutsen, Staffan I. Lindberg, Svend-Erik Skaaning, 
Jan Teorell, David Altman, Michael Bernhard, Agnes Cornell, M. Steven Fish, Haakon Gjerløw, Adam 
Glynn, Allen Hicken, Joshua Krusell, Anna Lührmann, Kyle L. Marquardt, Kelly McMann, Valeriya 
Mechkova, Moa Olin, Pamela Paxton, Daniel Pemstein, Brigitte Seim, Rachel Sigman, Jeffrey Sta-
ton, Aksel Sundtröm, Eitan Tzelgov, Luca Uberti, Yi-ting Wang, Tore Wig, and Daniel Ziblatt. 2018. 
“V-Dem Codebook v8” Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Project.
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tion of interaction effects, we centred the clientelism index around the mean at the 
country-year level in the sample of analysis.
Compulsory Voting We used the database from the International Institute for Democ-
racy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA)10 to control for whether voting is compulsory 
(1) or not (0).
Electoral System To account for differences in electoral systems we used the ‘Elec-
toral System Type’ variable from the V-Dem dataset, which distinguishes between 
proportional, majoritarian and mixed electoral systems.
Analytical Strategy
Before we tested our hypotheses, we did some exploratory analyses at the country-
year level, in which we plotted the income gap in voting against economic inequality. 
To formally test our hypotheses, we performed multilevel logistic regression models 
with three levels of analysis in order to correct the standard errors for the nested 
structure of our data, with individuals nested in country-years, nested in countries. 
Ignoring the multilevel structure in the data would have led to underestimation of 
the standard errors (Steenbergen and Jones 2002). As a first step, we performed a 
model with the main effects of relative income, the individual-level control vari-
ables, and economic inequality and national wealth as independent variables. In the 
second step, we tested whether the effects of relative income on voting varied with 
the level of economic inequality, by adding a cross-level interactions between rela-
tive income and economic inequality to the previous model. Since we expected that 
this cross-level interaction effect is negative in the less-wealthy countries and posi-
tive in the wealthy countries, we did not have a hypothesis for this interaction in the 
complete sample of countries. In the third step, we tested the three-way interaction 
between relative income, economic inequality and national wealth, to test Hypoth-
eses 1 and 2.
Based on the results of these analyses we proceeded to the fourth step in order to 
test Hypothesis 3. Although we expected to find a negative interaction between eco-
nomic inequality and relative income on voting only in less-wealthy countries, our 
results showed that this negative interaction holds in the complete sample and does 
not vary with levels of national wealth. We examined whether this can be explained 
by including clientelism. That is, we examined whether including a cross-level inter-
action between relative income and clientelism can explain the negative cross-level 
interaction between relative income and economic inequality.





First, we ran a series of logistic regression models to test the effect of relative income 
on voting in each separate country-year subsample in our data. We controlled for 
age, gender and education. Subsequently, we plotted the resulting regression coef-
ficients (the log-odds), as an indicator of the income gap in voting, against eco-
nomic inequality in Fig. 1. The figure shows that in most countries there is a ‘posi-
tive income gap’ in voting; individuals from higher income groups are more likely 
to vote than individuals from lower income countries, yet in a substantial number 
of countries there is a ‘negative income gap’. We fitted a regression line through 
the whole sample of country-years, and separate regression lines for the 50% poor-
est country-years and the 50% wealthiest country-years (based on GDP p.c.). Fig-
ure 1 shows that economic inequality is, overall, negatively related to the income 
gap in voting (r = −  0. 478, p < 0.001). However, as we expected, the association 
seems to depend on levels of national wealth. In the 50% poorest country-years, we 
see a negative association between economic inequality and the income gap in vot-
ing (r = − 0.354, p < 0.001). In the group of wealthier countries this association is 
slightly positive (r = . 183, p = 0.102).
Second, we explored the bivariate relationships between clientelism on the one 
hand and inequality, national wealth and the income gap in voting on the other hand. 
Fig. 1  Logistic regression coefficient for the effect of relative income on voting (controlled for education, 
gender and age) as a function of economic inequality (Gini coefficient) at the country-year level,, with 
regression lines fitted for the full sample, the poorest 50% and the wealthiest 50% country-years
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As expected, we found that clientelism is positively related to economic inequality 
(r = 0.698, p < 0.001), negatively related to national wealth (r = − 0.744, p < 0.001), 
and negatively related to the income gap in voting (r = −  0.495, p < 0.001) at the 
country-year level. In the next section we examine if the results of these exploratory 
analyses hold, by estimating multilevel models with the effect of relative income on 
voting, and its moderators, including control variables at the contextual level.
Multilevel Analyses
In Tables 2 and 3 the results of the multilevel analyses are presented. Model 1 of 
Table 2 contains only the main effects and shows that citizens with a higher relative 
income are more likely to vote (b = 0.010, se = 0.002), when controlled for contex-
tual-level variables, survey dummies and the individual-level variables age, gender 
and education. Further, economic inequality is negatively related to the likelihood to 
vote (b = 0.613, se = 0.235), and so is GDP p.c. (b = − 0.003, se = 0.001). In Model 
2 we added the interaction between relative income and economic inequality. The 
results show that citizens with a higher relative income are more likely to vote 
(b = 0.079, se = 0.011) at mean levels of economic inequality. This positive effect 
is weaker at higher levels of economic inequality (b relative income  ×  Gini = −  0.693, 
se = 0.133). This indicates that the income gap in voting is smaller at higher levels of 
economic inequality and may eventually turn into a ‘negative income gap’.
Now that we have analysed the moderating effect of economic inequality, we turn 
to the question whether the moderating effect of economic inequality varies with 
levels of national wealth. Model 3 shows that it does not vary with national wealth 
(b relative income  ×  Gini  ×  GDP. p.c. = 0.008, se = 0.011), also not when the interaction is 
modelled with a quadratic GDP p.c. variable in Model 4. We included the quadratic 
GDP p.c. variable because the effect of GINI on the income gap in voting might 
depend on GDP p.c. in a non-linear way. Hypothesis 2 is therefore only partly sup-
ported, since we expected to find a negative interaction between relative income 
and economic inequality in less-wealthy countries. However, the results suggest 
that this pattern is present in the complete sample of country-years. Hypothesis 1, 
which predicted a positive effect of economic inequality on the income gap in voting 
in wealthy countries, is thus rejected by these results. The results of our bivariate 
analyses, where we found differences between more- and less-wealthy countries, do 
not hold after employing multilevel logistic regression models with contextual-level 
control variables.
Subsequently, because we found a negative interaction between economic inequal-
ity and income in our complete sample, we examined the role of clientelism in our 
complete sample, instead of only in less-wealthy countries. First, we tested whether 
the effect of relative income is weaker at higher levels of clientelism. Second, we 
examined whether this in turn varies with levels of national wealth, since we initially 
anticipated that clientelism would be especially prevalent in less-wealthy countries. 
Third, we analysed whether clientelism (partly) explains the negative interaction 
between relative income and economic inequality. The results of Model 5 in Table 3 
show that relative income is positively related to voting (b = 0.083, se = 0.011) at 
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Table 2  Results of the multilevel regression models on voting, including the moderating effects of eco-
nomic inequality and national wealth  (Ncountries = 66;  Ncountry-years = 292;  Nindividuals = 510,184)
Gini, Clientelism and GDP p.c. are centered around the mean at the country-year level
Ref reference category, Comp. voting compulsory voting, Elect. syst. electoral system, GDP p.c.2 quad-
ratic GDP p.c.
*p < 0.05; **p < 0.01; ***p < 0.001
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
B SE B SE B SE B SE
Income 0.010*** 0.002 0.079*** 0.011 0.088*** 0.014 0.083*** 0.014
Gini  − 0.613** 0.235  − 2.840 1.546  − 5.675** 1.822  − 5.420** 0.218
GDP p.c  − 0.003** 0.001  − 0.019** 0.006  − 0.029*** 0.007  − 0.289*** 0.008
Income × Gini  − 0.693*** 0.133  − 0.327 0.205  − 0.586** 0.218
Income × GDP p.c 0.003** 0.001 0.004** 0.001
Gini × GDP p.c  − 0.179* 0.079  − 0.207 0.109
Income × Gini × GDP p.c 0.008 0.011 0.012 0.014
GDP p.c.2 0.000 0.000
Income × GDP p.c.2 0.000 0.000
Gini × GDP p.c.2  − 0.003 0.004
Income × Gini × GDP p.c.2 0.001 0.001
Control variables
Education 0.035*** 0.000 0.238*** 0.003 0.238*** 0.003 0.238*** 0.003
Age 0.027*** 0.000 0.149*** 0.001 0.149*** 0.001 0.149*** 0.001
Age squared  − 0.000*** 0.000  − 0.001*** 0.000  − 0.001*** 0.000  − 0.001*** 0.000
Female 0.001 0.001  − 0.008 0.007  − 0.008 0.007  − 0.008 0.007
Clientelism 0.029 0.077  − 0.046 0.506
Comp. voting 0.085* 0.037 0.518* 0.251 0.547* 0.246 0.531* 0.253
Elect. syst. (Major. = ref.)
Proportional  − 0.026 0.040  − 0.172 0.271  − 0.285 0.272  − 0.309 0.281
Mixed  − 0.005 0.041 0.007 0.274  − 0.069 0.270  − 0.100 0.282
Survey (ESS = ref.)
WVS 0.072*** 0.003 0.499*** 0.020 0.499*** 0.020 0.499*** 0.020
LAPOP 0.177*** 0.005 1.187*** 0.036 1.191*** 0.036 1.191*** 0.036
ASIAN 0.027*** 0.008 0.145* 0.058 0.147* 0.058 0.149** 0.058
ISSP  − 0.000 0.002 0.009 0.016 0.010 0.016 0.010 0.016
Intercept  − 0.155*** 0.037  − 3.966*** 0.252  − 4.047*** 0.251  − 3.977*** 0.275
Variance components
Country
RE income 0.000 0.000 0.006 0.001 0.005 0.001 0.005 0.001
Intercept 0.012 0.002 0.606 0.119 0.584 0.114 0.578 0.114
Country-year
RE income 0.000 0.000 0.004 0.000 0.004 0.001 0.004 0.001
Intercept 0.003 0.000 0.128 0.014 0.126 0.014 0.126 0.014
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mean levels of clientelism, and that this effect is weaker at higher levels of clien-
telism (b relative income × clientelism = − 0.237, se = 0.046). The results of Model 6 show 
that the interaction between relative income and clientelism does not vary with lev-
els of national wealth per capita  (brelative income × Clientel × GDP. p.c. = − 0.002, se = 0.004).
Table 3  Results of the multilevel regression models on voting, additionally including the moderating 
effect of clientelism  (Ncountries = 66;  Ncountry-years = 292;  Nindividuals = 510,184)
Gini, Clientelism and GDP p.c. are centered around the mean at the country-year level
Ref reference category, RE random effect, Client. Clientelism, Comp. voting compulsory voting, Elect. 
syst. electoral system
*p < 0.05; **p < 0.01; ***p < 0.001
Model 5 Model 6 Model 7
B SE B SE B SE
Income 0.083*** 0.011 0.077*** 0.016 0.082*** 0.010
Clientelism 0.111 0.505 − 0.178 0.696 0.045 0.506
GDP p.c − 0.020** 0.006 − 0.016* 0.008 − 0.019** 0.006
Gini − 3.356* 0.537 − 3.060* (0.544
Income × Client − 0.237*** 0.046 − 0.169 0.091 − 0.147** 0.057
Income × GDP p.c 0.002 0.001
Client. × GDP p.c 0.011 0.033
Income × Client. × GDP p.c − 0.002 0.004
Income × Gini − 0.419* 0.167
Control variables
Education 0.238*** 0.003 0.238*** 0.003 0.238*** 0.003
Age 0.149*** 0.001 0.149*** 0.001 0.149*** 0.001
Age squared − 0.001*** 0.000 − 0.001*** 0.000 − 0.001*** 0.000
Female − 0.008 0.007 − 0.008 0.007 − 0.008 0.007
Compulsory voting 0.538* 0.250 0.286 0.232 0.526* 0.250
Elect. syst. (Major. = ref.)
Proportional − 0.183 0.271 − 0.126 0.277 − 0.179 0.270
Mixed − 0.005 0.273 0.029 0.284 − 0.001 0.273
Survey (ESS = ref.)
WVS 0.499*** 0.020 0.498*** 0.020 0.499*** 0.020
LAPOP 1.188*** 0.036 1.187*** 0.036 1.187*** 0.036
ASIAN 0.146* 0.058 0.145* 0.058 0.146* 0.058
ISSP 0.009 0.016 0.009 0.016 0.009 0.016
Intercept − 3.964*** 0.251 − 3.897*** 0.283 − 3.963*** 0.251
Variance components
Country
RE income 0.006 0.001 0.006 0.001 0.006 0.001
Intercept 0.602 0.118 0.651 0.126 0.601 0.118
Country-year
RE income 0.004 0.001 0.004 0.001 0.004 0.001
Intercept 0.128 0.014 0.128 0.014 0.128 0.014
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The results of Model 7 show that the interaction between relative income 
and clientelism cannot completely explain the negative interaction between 
relative income and economic inequality that we found in Model 2. Namely, 
the interaction between relative income and clientelism is again significant 
 (brelative income  ×  clientelism = −  0.147, se = 0.057) when both interaction terms are 
included, but the interaction between relative income and inequality is also still 
significant (b relative income  ×  Gini = −  0.419, se = 0.167). Including the interaction 
between relative income and clientelism decreased the moderating effect of eco-
nomic inequality with about 40% compared to Model 2. Figure 2 shows the pre-
dicted probabilities of voting for all income quintiles, and the marginal effects of 
relative income, at different levels of inequality (left panel) and clientelism (right 
panel) based on Model 7.
The left panel of Fig.  2 shows that the likelihood to vote decreases for all 
income groups when economic inequality is higher. This effect is slightly 
stronger for the higher income groups, and therefore the income gap in voting 
is smaller when economic inequality is higher. The right panel of Fig. 2 shows 
that the decreasing effect of income at higher levels of clientelism is due to the 
higher income groups being less likely to vote. This is in line with the argument 
that clientelism negatively affects the sense of efficacy and the likelihood to vote 
for higher income groups. However, the likelihood to vote for the lower income 
groups is hardly affected by the level of clientelism. This is in not line with our 
argument that the lower income groups are mobilized when political parties use 
clientelistic mobilisation strategies. In sum, the prevalence of clientelism may be 
one of the mechanisms through which economic inequality negatively affects the 
income gap in voting, but it does not affect lower income groups in the way we 
anticipated.
Fig. 2  Predicted probabilities of voting by income quintile, and the marginal effects of relative income 
on voting, as a function of economic inequality (left panel) and clientelism (right panel) based on Model 
7. Note Model 7 includes the interaction between relative income and economic inequality as well as the 
interaction between relative income and clientelism. The 10th percentile in the distribution of economic 
inequality (Gini) and clientelism at the country-year level was taken as the low level. The 50th percentile 




In this study we investigated whether the income gap in voting turnout varies 
with economic inequality at the country-year level. We aimed to bring together 
previous studies on economic inequality and the income gap in voting, since 
the results of these studies contradict each other. We did so by formulating new 
hypotheses. First, we expected the relationship between economic inequality and 
the income gap in voting to vary by the national level of wealth. Based on the 
relative power theory (Solt 2008), we expected a positive association between 
economic inequality and the income gap in voting in relatively wealthy countries 
(H1). Based on recent studies that included a wider sample of countries (Amat 
and Beramendi 2016; Matsubayashi and Sakaiya 2018), we expected a negative 
association between economic inequality and the income gap in voting in less-
wealthy countries (H2). Second we hypothesized that clientelism would explain 
the negative interaction between income and inequality at lower levels of national 
wealth. Namely, we anticipated that the prevalence of clientelism would increase 
the likelihood to vote for lower income groups, decrease the likelihood to vote 
for higher income groups, and therewith weaken the positive effect of income on 
voting. Our final sample of analysis consists of 68 countries from different conti-
nents, and 292 country-years, including 510,184 individuals, and thus exceed the 
most elaborate sample used in previous studies that explicitly tested the relation-
ship between income inequality and voting.
We found that, in general, higher income groups are more likely to vote. The 
positive effect of income was found to be weaker at higher levels of economic 
inequality. We found that this pattern does not vary with levels of national wealth, 
which means that Hypothesis 1 is not supported. This finding does not support 
our predictions based on relative power theory. This does not imply that we did 
not find any evidence for the relative power theory; the negative main effect of 
economic inequality on voting is in line with this theory, however, the theory’s 
prediction that increasing economic inequality also results in an increased income 
gap in voting is not supported. The latter is not in line with conclusions from 
Schäfer and Schwander’s (2019) recent work in which they studied 21 OECD 
countries. They controlled for a wider variety of country(-year) characteristics, 
their data covered a longer time period but a smaller sample of countries, and 
the individual-level control variables differ from our models. For example, they 
included union membership and marital status, but not education. Moreover, it 
has to be noted that the positive interaction between relative income and eco-
nomic inequality that Solt (2008) described was in fact not significant, in Gal-
lego’s (2015) study it was gross income inequality that predicted a larger income 
gap in voting, whereas no effect of net income inequality was found, and Filetti 
and Janmaat (2018) also found no significant interaction when it comes to vot-
ing. When combining our results with those of earlier studies, it seems that alto-
gether there is inconclusive evidence about whether higher net income inequality 
is related to a higher income gap in turnout in wealthy countries. Future stud-
ies should therefore still try to uncover the presumed mechanism through which 
1 3
Political Behavior 
economic inequality would widen the income gap in voting more precisely, and 
the conditions under which this would occur, in order to shed more light on the 
inconclusive findings in the literature so far.
Although our results do not underline the concerns based on relative power 
theory’s predictions, i.e. political and economic inequality reinforce each other, 
our findings support previous studies’ conclusions that voter turnout in general is 
depressed by economic inequality (Horn 2011; Polacko et al. 2020; Solt 2008; but 
see Stockemer and Scruggs 2012), which raises other concerns. Low rates of par-
ticipation may be regarded as a sign of disaffection and a threat to the function-
ing of democracy (Lijphart 1997; Norris 1999; but see Rosema 2007; Lutz and 
Marsh 2007). Moreover, that the income gap in voting does not vary with economic 
inequality in wealthier countries does not necessarily mean that political inequal-
ity remains unaffected. Higher socioeconomic groups participate to a higher rate in 
other forms of politics as well (e.g. Brady et  al. 1995; Hakhverdian et  al. 2012), 
and Solt (2015) showed that relative power theory’s predictions are confirmed for 
various forms of non-violent protest. Similarly, Filetti and Janmaat (2018) showed 
that in Europe, income inequality widens the gap between the rich and the poor 
for boycotting products and signing petitions, but not for voting. Moreover, politi-
cal inequality is more than inequality in political participation. It also comprises the 
extent to which various groups are involved in civil society organizations, are rep-
resented in government, are able to set the political agenda, and influence political 
decisions and the implementations of those decisions (Houle 2018; Schakel 2020). 
When taking such a broad conceptualization of political equality, it was found to 
be negatively related to economic inequality at the macro level in a global sam-
ple of countries (Houle 2018). Moreover, policy in advanced democracies is more 
responsive to higher income groups than it is to middle- and low-income groups 
(Schakel 2020). Altogether, our results combined with other studies do not imply 
that economic and political inequality cannot reinforce each other, but it is important 
to study their interrelationships for various forms of political participation and other 
forms of power, to get a better insight in how economic inequality affects political 
inequality, and vice versa, in wealthy democracies.
The negative association between economic inequality and the income gap in vot-
ing is in line with Hypothesis 2 for the less-wealthy countries. However, since we 
found this pattern in the complete sample of countries, we investigated the mod-
erating role of clientelism in the complete sample. These analyses showed that the 
effect of relative income is weaker when levels of clientelism are higher, which was 
constant across levels of national wealth. When clientelism and economic inequality 
were both included as moderators, both interactions were significant, but the interac-
tion between economic inequality and income was reduced. It suggests that although 
clientelism might partially explain why economic inequality reduces the income 
gap in voter turnout, there must also be other mechanisms that explain a negative 
relationship between economic inequality and political inequality. Hypothesis 3 was 
therefore only partly supported by our results.
Moreover, the prevalence of clientelism does not exactly work as we argued. The 
lower income groups are not more likely to vote when clientelism is higher, which is 
not in line with Amat and Beramendi’s (2016) argument that lower income groups 
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would be responsive to direct short-term benefits. However, higher income groups 
are less likely to vote when clientelism is higher, which is in line with the theoretical 
mechanism we outlined based on Matsubayashi and Sakaiya’s (2018) argument on 
vote-buying. Since higher income citizens are not the target of clientelistic strate-
gies, they might perceive political parties that employ such strategies as corrupt and 
unfair, negatively affecting their sense of political trust and efficacy, and their likeli-
hood to vote. Since our results suggest that especially the higher income groups are 
responsive to contextual conditions, further studies should analyze more precisely 
why, beyond only focusing on political parties’ mobilization strategies. Following 
Kasara and Suryanarayan (2015, 2020), higher income groups are more likely to 
vote when the potential tax exposure of the rich is high. This is the case when the 
state’s capacity to tax income is higher. It is likely that the poorer, more unequal 
countries with high levels of clientelism in our sample are also countries with low 
bureaucratic capacity (Kitschelt and Wilkinson 2007; Kasara and Suryanarayan 
2015). Future studies could therefore explore to what extent the associations 
between clientelism and inequality on the one hand, and the income gap in voting on 
the other hand, can be explained by the state’s bureaucratic capacity and government 
effectiveness (Kasara and Suryanarayan 2020).
This study was limited in certain aspects and therefore future research could 
try to improve upon our study in several other ways. First, we only looked at the 
effect of net income inequality measured with the Gini coefficient. Future studies 
may compare different measures of economic inequality (e.g. gross Gini, P90/P10) 
to study whether our results are robust to different operationalizations of economic 
inequality (see Gallego 2015 for a discussion on gross and net inequality). Sec-
ond, our measure of relative income is not perfectly comparable between surveys, 
although we created income quintiles for each country-year for each survey. Namely, 
in some surveys these quintiles were based on the actual income distribution in the 
country (ESS after 2006, ASIAN & ISSP) and in some surveys these categories 
were based on the income distribution of the sample (LAPOP, WVS, ESS before 
2006). We explored the extent to which the differences in measurement between 
surveys affected the estimate for the effect of relative income on voting in Online 
Appendix 3. These comparisons lead us to cautiously conclude that, overall, differ-
ences in the effect of income are not caused by different operationalizations of the 
income variable between surveys. To control for survey differences in our models, 
we included dummy variables for the surveys in each model.
Notwithstanding these limitations, this study adds some important insights to 
the literature on economic and political inequality. Our study’s results question 
the assumption that economic inequality undermines political equality in voting in 
wealthy democracies and indicate that, in general, economic inequality is even nega-
tively related to inequality in voting. Although clientelism partially explains why 
economic inequality reduces the income gap in voter turnout, it does not do so in 
the way we expected. Importantly, our results do not imply that economic inequality 
is positive for democratic representation, since economic inequality was found to 
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depress the likelihood of voting for all income groups, and other studies indicated 
that economic inequality is associated with political inequality in several other ways 
than through voting.
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